Public Diplomacy

China’s Newest Charm Offensive

Since its creation by Joshua Kurlantzick in 2007, the term ‘charm offensive’ has emerged in the study of International Relations as a reference to China’s use of soft power to augment its global status and image. While the idea of China charming the world with its economic and cultural prowess has not changed too much, the ways Beijing has adopted to charm other states have diversified since. In conjunction with such developments, the term ‘public diplomacy’ has, of late, come to replace charm offensive as China’s latest offensive to improve its prestige through soft means.

In simple terms, public diplomacy refers to various ways of conducting diplomacy or fostering bilateral exchange with other countries beyond the state level. It means that besides traditional state-to-state diplomacy, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and individuals occupy an important role in China’s latest foreign policy endeavours. Hinged on the concept of fostering people-to-people relations, China seeks to move away from the popular image of ‘China threat’ to a more cordial image of China as a friendly and peace-loving nation.

Noting China’s recent turn towards public diplomacy, this article addresses the topic in three sections. Part one examines the idea of public diplomacy and corresponding developments that took place in China since former President Hu Jintao’s emphasis on the concept in 2009. Part two looks into the idea of ‘telling a good story of China’ – an important guiding principle of China’s public diplomacy – and corresponding efforts Beijing has made towards it. Part three discusses the Confucius Institute and China Cultural Centres, and their contributions towards the goals of ‘telling a good story’ and fostering people-to-people relations. It concludes with some considerations on the challenges China may face in its public diplomacy endeavour.

From Peaceful Rise to Public Diplomacy

In 2009, speaking at the 11^th Conference of Chinese Diplomatic Envoys Stationed Abroad, the then Chinese President Hu Jintao expounded on the importance of public diplomacy in Chinese foreign policy. He said, “[China] should strengthen public diplomacy and humanities diplomacy, and commence various kinds of cultural exchange activities in order to disseminate China’s great culture’. Hu’s address was significant as the statement marked the first time China considered the concept of public diplomacy at national policy level.

The notion gradually developed into a notable priority in Xi Jinping administration. In Hu Jintao’s report at 18th Party Congress of the Communist Party of China (CCP), which was held in 2012, the CCP clearly expressed its aspiration to “… take solid steps to promote public diplomacy as well as people-to-people and cultural exchanges, and protect China’s legitimate rights and interests overseas. In 2013, President Xi Jinping followed up by introducing the corresponding concept of “tell China’s stories well” and spread China’s voice well. ‘Tell China’s stories well’ quickly became the central tenet of China’s public diplomacy.

Under the state emphasis on public diplomacy, various public, private and academic institutions and organisations were established to carry out the function of reshaping China’s global image. In 2009, the Public Diplomacy Office was established as the main official body for managing and coordinating tasks related to public diplomacy on the state and departmental levels. Responding to Beijing’s call for public diplomacy, a number of private associations were also established. One such example is the China Public Diplomacy Association which was established in December 2012. The association serves as an informal channel for China to communicate with the world; the participation of academics and retired officials gives the functions hosted by the association a track two or semi-official nature.

Institutional establishment aside, it is important to recognise that public diplomacy did not grow out of a vacuum in China rather it came about following a series of adjustments in Chinese foreign policy to cope with the so-called ‘China threat theory’. In an essay in a 2005 issue of the influential Foreign Affairs magazine, Vice President of China’s Central Party School Zheng Bijian articulated in simple terms that China seeks a ‘peaceful rise’ and not otherwise. Since the term ‘rise’ connotes a powerful China becoming more assertive in international affairs, the term was later replaced with ‘development’ to suggest a less negative connotation. In the context of peaceful development, Hu Jintao administration subsequently introduced the concept of ‘harmonious worldview’ and re-emphasised China’s good neighbour policy.

Public diplomacy as China’s new foreign policy emphasis came about in a similar vein. Following leadership change in 2013, President Xi Jinping proposed the ‘China Dream’ as the new guiding concept for China’s future. In Xi’s words, ‘China Dream is the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’. Xi’s ideological calling, however, provided little hints as to how China seeks to realise its reoccupation of the centre stage of the world again. Such a void is perhaps covered by public diplomacy. In other words, in terms of China Dream, the part of how the Chinese nation will be rejuvenated rests with how well China fares in public diplomacy, or an effort to improve China’s global image. In such a case, similar to related concepts introduced in the Hu Jintao era, the China Dream and public diplomacy are proposed as interconnected and mutually reinforcing concepts.  Under Xi Jinping, the China Dream is the grand ideological principle that will guide China’s continued development in the near future while public diplomacy – similar to the ‘good-neighbour policy’ – is one of the ways Xi’s vision will be realised.

Telling China’s Story Well

The guiding principle for China’s current public diplomacy drive is ‘telling China’s story well’, a notion that has been repeated publicly by President Xi Jinping since the 18^th National Congress of the CCP. Noting the tendency of Chinese leaders since Jiang Zemin to pronounce their policy ambitions in short captivating phrases, ‘telling China’s story well’ is one of the latest notable phrases to follow in the string of announcements from the Three Represents to ‘scientific outlook on development’. While ‘telling China’s story well’ has attracted global attention in recent years; interestingly, the concept is not entirely new. In 2010, John and Doris Naisbitt published “China’s Megatrends: The 8 Pillars of a New Society,” a volume that detailed China’s rapid political, economic and social changes over the past two decades.

Regardless of the reception of Naisbitt’s work, the idea of ‘telling China’s story well’ became a foreign policy priority under Xi Jinping that is to be realised through various forms of public diplomacy. On 13 August 2013, in a speech given at the National Propaganda and Ideology Work Conference, President Xi stressed the importance of establishing new forms of propaganda aimed at ‘telling China’s story well and disseminating China’s voice well’. The speech opened up the watershed for discussions on storytelling in China. While the political nature of Xi’s call is easy to notice, the statement nonetheless paved the way for various efforts towards defining and realising its content.

In terms of development, President Xi proposed the Belt and Road (B&R) initiative, an ambitious geopolitical project that seeks to integrate Asia, Europe and Africa into an intercontinental market and transport network. The Silk Road Fund (SRF) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) were subsequently established to finance the project. Based on the integration and investment initiatives, President Xi has expounded on the theme of development, most notably at the 2016 G20 Summit in Hangzhou, where he delivered a speech ‘A New Starting Point for China’s Development: A New Blueprint for Global Growth’ and at the 2017 Belt and Road Summit in Beijing, where Xi referred to China’s historical connection with the Silk Road and elaborated on themes including economic, infrastructure, innovation and green development. In addition, the Chinese government has invested great efforts in promoting the B&R through various methods, which includes the publication of the B&R Public Diplomacy Report (2016), the production of a major documentary series on the B&R (2016), and the release of a project theme song just ahead of the 2017 B&R Forum.

Concerning the B&R, such presentation can be observed from the frequent reference by the state to Zhang Qian and Zheng He, historical figures in China’s ancient past who are regarded as the trailblazers for what came to be known as the Silk Road and China’s maritime trade route respectively. Emphasis on the individual can also be observed from the B&R documentary series produced by China Central Television (CCTV), China’s official broadcasting service. Besides interviews with influential figures and experts, the documentary is interwoven with the personal stories of some 60 common individuals who dwell along the B&R. Finally, China is represented by its political and business elites, or individuals who receive media attention internationally. Such an approach is exemplified by the so-called ‘head of state diplomacy’ that sees Chinese leaders promoting China’s national image abroad. Since assuming the role of China’s top leader in 2013, Xi Jinping has made official visits to more than a dozen states annually, consolidating China’s foreign relations while gathering international spotlight on China through wide media coverage and reporting.

Tools of Public Diplomacy:

1. Confucius Institute

Under the Hu Jintao administration, the Confucius Institute, a state-sponsored institution with the objective of teaching and promoting the learning of the Chinese language abroad, was established under Confucius Institute Headquarters, also known as the Hanban, in 2004. The Hanban is responsible for overseeing the operation of the global network of Confucius Institutes across the world. The Confucius Institute was envisioned by Beijing as a way to reduce the anxieties surrounding China while promoting China’s image as a benevolent and peaceful power abroad. Soft power, a term coined by political scientist Joseph S. Nye, was the keyword associated with the Confucius Institute and China’s adoption of soft means to improve its global image then.

Since the establishment of the first Confucius Institute in Korea in 2004, their number has grown rapidly. By the end of 2016, China had established 512 Confucius Institutes and 1073 Confucius Classrooms in more than 140 countries around the world. While the Confucius Institute is primarily a language-teaching institution, it is inevitable that its curriculum and textbooks are infused with lessons and stories on Chinese history and culture. In such a sense, the Confucius Institute fits well with the guideline of ‘telling China’s story well’ and the objectives of China’s public diplomacy. Through the organisation of cultural events and language competitions, the Confucius Institute also enhances people-to-people relations with direct interaction between foreign and Chinese participants and organisers. The annual ‘Chinese Bridge’ Chinese Proficiency Competition is a good example of the Confucius Institute’s public diplomacy achievement.

2. China Cultural Centre

China has also established cultural centres across the world as a way to promote Chinese culture beyond classrooms. Since the establishment of first China Cultural Centres in Benin, and Mauritius in 1988, more than 20 cultural centres have been established in Asia, Africa, Europe, Oceania and Central America, with most of the additional locations introduced after 2000. China currently hosts 27 international cultural centres, with a large number of them spread out across Asia and Europe. The China Cultural Centre organises cultural activities such as performances, exhibitions and art festivals and provides Chinese language and cultural training. In terms of public diplomacy, the China Cultural Centre plays no small role in disseminating knowledge on China through the constant organisation of musical performances and art and calligraphy exhibitions and events among others.  Meanwhile, in 2012, China’s Ministry of Culture introduced ‘Happy Chinese New Year’ (HCNY), a series of cultural festivities centred on the theme of Chinese New Year. Adopting the central tenet of ‘happiness, harmony, dialogue and sharing’, the HCNY celebrations seek to tell a story of China that is robust and cherishes communal values, which stands in stark contrast with arguments that deem China as a colossal threat.

Prospects of China’s Public Diplomacy

While it is much too early to evaluate the success of China’s new charm offensive, previous experiments with soft power by Beijing present several challenges that China needs to address if it hopes to find success with public diplomacy.

First, while China provides a definition of ‘public diplomacy’ in its official public diplomacy report, to some extent, the definition remains excessively general and difficult to translate into real policies. While an optimistic reading of China’s definition suggests the inclusion of governments, NGOs and individuals is a non-discriminatory act that seeks to exploit the full strength of the nation in realising public diplomacy, an alternative reading raises the question whether there exists a one size fits all policy guideline for all the actors. After all, diplomacy is traditionally limited to the realm of the state; to move diplomacy outside the state may require policymakers to think outside the box, as private and non-governmental actors may harbour widely different interpretations of the state and its various features. In other words, China is viewed differently across different levels and sectors and narratives may contradict.

Second, the fact that China remains an authoritative regime generates contradictions with the concept of public diplomacy that are hard to resolve. Even though public diplomacy can be considered an interest-driven action regardless of regime type, China’s authoritative character exacerbates the issue by hinting at the potential involvement of sophisticated consequences.  For example, by enshrining the guideline of ‘telling China’s story well and disseminating China’s voice well’ as propaganda, China proposes a dilemma between the nature of the Chinese regime and public diplomacy. If public diplomacy is guided by the principle of disseminating propaganda, how credible are China’s foreign policy communications and actions? Indeed, such tensions have been raised in the past concerning the Confucius Institute. As critics point out, under its disguise to pass on knowledge of Chinese language and culture to the outside world, the Confucius Institute also encourages students to think highly of China and its ruling political elite. While such claims remain controversial and rebuffed by China, backlashes have occurred, with institutions such as the University of Chicago and Pennsylvania State University terminating their cooperation with the Confucius Institute and many other institutions around the world becoming more vigilant over China’s public diplomacy. As the case of the Confucius Institute demonstrates, trust remains a crucial ingredient for the success of China’s language teaching institutes abroad and ultimately, China’s public diplomacy. How Beijing seeks to increase the world’s trust in China in the near future remains to be observed.