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The four-tier leadership of three countries discussed two crucial issues at one platform. They discussed the Afghan-led peace and reconciliation process and how to strengthen joint efforts to address extremism and advance regional peace and stability and, for the first time, they set a target of six months for a reconciliation process to succeed in Afghanistan.
Setting a targeting of six months is not the only decision taken at Chequers Summit, the Afghan government and particularly Afghan President Hamid Karzai agreed for the first time on opening of an office in Doha for the purpose of negotiations between the Taliban and the High Peace Council of Afghanistan as part of an Afghan-led peace process.
Doha Office and Hamid Karzai’s reluctance:
President Karzai has never shown his excitement for Doha Office and intra-Afghan talks in Doha. It is believed that President Hamid Karzai fears that Doha Office may be used between Afghan political parties which are in opposition to President Hamid Karzai and the Taliban at the same time. President Karzai has so far been successful in painting himself as the only alternative of Taliban in Afghanistan. And that is why he was opposed to opening for an office in Doha. The question is as to why he has shown his willingness to accept Doha Office? There are possibly two explanations to answer this question. President Karzai himself has announced not to be a candidate in the forthcoming presidential election inside Afghanistan. So it is no more a headache of President Karzai as to who holds talks with whom in the aftermath of him, leaving the Presidential Palace. This explanation may sound over-simplistic in the wake of shrewd personality of President Karzai. President Karzai is not a nave person and understands the consequences of Taliban coming closer to other political forces inside Afghanistan. Although the Summit reaffirmed, in terms of Doha Office, that the end result should be one in which all Afghans can participate peacefully in the country’s political future and called on Taliban to take those steps necessary to open an office and to enter into a dialogue. However, President Karzai agreed to opening of an office in Doha with certain pre-conditions. The Karzai administration is now insisting that the Qatar authorities permit the setting up of the Taliban office in Doha only after exchanging a memorandum of understanding. The MoU would include assurances that the Taliban office would not be used for any ‘political purpose’ other than direct negotiations with Afghanistan.
President Karzai and his delegation briefed on the Afghan vision and roadmap for peace and reconciliation inside Afghanistan. The setting of timeframe of six months for certain agreement may sound unrealistic to many but it does have some elements of optimism. The Taliban have always said ‘no’ to direct talks with the Afghan government. First in Paris in recent weeks, the Taliban representatives held talks, face to face with the Afghan government representatives. So the psychological barrier of running shy of the Afghan government is over now. The two sides can get engaged in Doha as frequently as possible and desirable. Secondly, Pakistan has remained committed to facilitating the Afghan-led and Afghan-owned reconciliation process and on the consistent demand of Afghan High Peace Council has so far released 26 Afghan Taliban. Their release is deemed to accelerate the reconciliation process. Thirdly, preparations are continuing for holding a joint conference of Afghan and Pakistani Ulema for peace and stability inside Afghanistan.
The trilateral summit also brought Pakistani and Afghan leadership, at levels, to sit together and try to further improve their bilateral relations. Due to the understanding reached at Chequers, the two sides are planning to schedule meetings between the interior ministers, foreign ministers and commerce ministers. The process is expected to help formulate the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA). In the same context, the two sides also want to build greater trust and cooperation between their military and security services as “the Afghan and Pakistani Chiefs of Defence Staff and Intelligence enjoyed fruitful discussions and agreed on new mechanisms for strengthening cooperationâ€. And such an expectation is not without any concrete basis. The Chequers summit had been preceded by an unprecedented visit of the Afghan defence minister to Pakistan in the course of which there had been Afghan acknowledgement of Pakistan’s positive role in advancing reconciliation. There are a number of hints that, during this visit, Afghanistan saw advantages in having its armed forces personnel trained in Pakistani training institutes.
Conclusion:
The Chequers Trilateral Summit sounded a loud message of urgency for peace and stability inside Afghanistan. The dividends of peace will not only ensure peace for the people in the region but also open a new horizon of economic stability and prosperity through interdependence. Pakistan’s overland trade with Central Asia and Afghanistan exports to India are still at the nascent stage. That is essential if Afghanistan is to be seen in Pakistan through an economic rather than a security prism. Pakistan’s trade with Central Asia, revenues for Afghanistan thus generated and creating an economic interdependence, is clearly in bilateral interests of Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is time for Pakistan to reconsider its priorities whether to treat Afghanistan through security diplomacy or it is ready to usher into a new era of mutual partnership through economic interdependence. For any visionary realization, all centres of powers have to be on the same page as promised at the Chequers Summit.
