Defensive & Offensive Realism

Realists are a dominant school of thought in international relations. After classical thoughts in realism, structural realism or neorealism gained popularity due to its relatively more relevance to understanding global politics. Offensive and defensive realism are actually subdivisions of structural realism or neorealism proposed by Kenneth Waltz in his monumental work ‘Theory of International Politics’—published in 1979. Waltz negates the role of domestic institutions, diplomacy and human nature in defining the states’ behaviour while formulating their foreign policies or while conducting international relations. The ‘sameness’ of states’ behaviour, the world often witnesses in the global political arena, is the net result of the anarchical international system in which order and hierarchy are obscure. Though offensive realists propose that states should become hegemons if they have the opportunity to do so, hegemony is not a long-term panacea to the structural defects created by anarchy and the ensuing security dilemma. To structural realists, especially the defensive ones, the most viable option for a stable international order is the one that curtails conflicts among states, e.g. balance of power and bipolarity.

Defensive Realism

 Defensive realists, such as Kenneth Waltz himself, believe that maximization of power by a state may perturb others states, and it may even lead to a conflict; so, the states must remain security-oriented not hegemony-, power- or influence-oriented as the pursuit of the latter ones, according to the defensive realists, is sheer recklessness. Due to the ‘lawless’ international system, the major concern of the nations is not dominance but survival and security, and states, the defensive realists posit, are primarily not revisionist in the attitude while operating in international system rather they are security-seekers. In an anarchical global order, adoption of moderate and defensive policies is what rationality and pragmatism demand from states. Waltz asserts, “In anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if survival is assured can states seek such other goals as tranquillity, profit, and power.” The natural tendency of the states is to seek minimum power and capabilities—deterrence—needed for their self preservation. To defensive realists, anarchy is not a cause of perpetual competition for power among nations but actually a reason for adopting defensive, moderate and security-oriented policies and strategies. Conflicts and wars are sometimes unavoidable, but they are largely for defence purposes, and not for intervention or expansion. It is because, defensive realists believe, expansion and intervention receive same kind of behaviour from other states and may lead to an unending lust for power—which is not the case as the states are mostly satisfied with the existing level of minimum security.   

Offensive Realism           

Although structural realists, both offensive and defensive, agree on several points, to many noted structural realists, offensive realism is a more practical approach than defensive realism towards international relations. Contrary to defensive realism, offensive realism suggests that there is an unending struggle for build-up of power, particularly military power, to achieve hegemony or to maximize influence in international arena. The theory seems more relevant in our part of the world keeping in view the power competition between India and China. The theory was propounded by John Mearsheimer who posits that the anarchic international system in world politics is the cause of states’ offensive behaviour. After Waltz’s contribution through his Theory of International Politics, Mearsheimer’s Tragedy of Great Power Politics is considered an authoritative and a major contribution to the realist paradigm. The core theme of Mearsheimer’s work is that states maximize their relative power—which is similar to Morgenthau’s postulation—but the source of inspiration for power is different. According to Mearsheimer, it is not the humans’ unending urge for accumulation of maximum power, but the structure of international system which lacks a central authority to oversee and regulate the dealings among the nation-states.  

Mearsheimer bases his offensive realism on five major assumptions:

First, contrary to the domestic politics, where hierarchy of power prevails, there is no such discipline in international politics, rather there is an environment of anarchy. States being primary actors in the global arena have to operate in this system where there is no authority to do justice or to, at least, arbitrate among states. 

Second, the way this is an undeniable reality that the system is anarchic; it is also a fact that all states possess damage-inflicting capabilities, e.g. military power. Concerns would be natural that it might be used anytime against any other state or against the neighbours.

Third, states can never predict the intentions of the other states with what Mearsheimer calls ‘high degree of certainty’. It is very hard to assess if a state is really aspiring to alter the balance of power in its favour.

Fourth, while operating in the global political system, a state’s first priority is its survival. Its responsibility to keep its geographical boundaries intact is superior to all other objectives. It means that a state’s national security is its first and foremost responsibility; human and other aspects of security come afterwards.

Fifth, the states, being rational actors, would formulate pragmatic policies and devise strategies to accomplish their primary responsibility of safeguarding their survival. They may make mistakes sometimes due to erroneous calculations and imperfect information, but, generally, most of the states’ actions and policies are rational, when it comes to their survival.

To sum up, the anarchic structure, states’ military power, their unpredictable intentions, their primary objective of survival and to ensure existence through rational actions, are all five factor which direct a state’s behaviour in world politics. These assumptions imply that states strive for power to resolve the security dilemma created by such uncertain, dynamic and unsparing structure of international system. One can plainly infer from the above discussion that, for states, perpetual vigilance is not an option, it’s a compulsion. So, it is imperative for states, Mearsheimer posits, not only to render a continuous struggle for maximizing their power but also to keep a vigilant eye on other states and be alarmed if one is gaining relatively higher degree of power.

It seems apt to conclude this piece by saying that the struggle for relative gains among various powers of the world, especially between the United States and China, is, at present, going on full throttle. Modernization of military by both these states, creation of alliances, optimum use of diplomacy, intelligence and all other types of resources are being put together to pursue their interests at land, seas and air. Both powers are clearly offensive realists and they are the ones capable of directing and defining the global political environment. Their competition, realists claim, will only intensify their relative power struggle because they “are trapped in an iron cage where they have little choice but to compete with each other for power, if they hope to survive.” Thus, as China rises to the level that US perceive it as a challenge, their competition will gain more and more momentum and the ensuing security dilemma will further aggravate the geopolitical rivalry between the two great powers. This tendency has full potential to cause serious damage to world peace and stability. 

The writer is an analyst.

He can be reached at: mustansar.tasir@gmail.com