Will Obama Strategy Succeed?

The success of the American strategy would depend upon the regional support for any solution to be sustainable and permanent. The US needs to align the regional countries for an Afghan solution which is possible due to engagement with these countries. Other key factors include the ability of the Afghan government to improve its governance and building up capacity of Afghan security forces to take over the overall security responsibility after the 2014 withdrawal.

While both Pakistan and the US seem to grapple with the diplomatic impasse in their bilateral relations that arose out of the NATO’s aerial strike on a military check post in Mohmand Agency and which forced Pakistan to block NATO’s supplies and review the terms of engagement with the US, developments on the Afghan situation indicate significant shift in the US approach. Though the Bonn Conference II held in December 2011 failed to get representation either from Pakistan or Taliban—two important players in the Afghan conflict following last minute intervention by President Hamid Karzai, the officials of the US administration did not lose heart and continued to engage with the Taliban at some level.

Hardly had one month passed since the Bonn II that the US Vice President Joe Biden made a sterling statement, saying, ‘Taliban per se is not the enemy of the United States.’ He also referred to President Obama who never declared Taliban as the direct enemies of the US. The statement won an immediate support from Afghan President Hamid Karzai who dubbed it as a significant move forward towards peace in his war-torn country.

Coming on the heels of US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s bold speech in February 2010 in which she said that cessation of contacts with Al-Qaeda, renunciation of violence and acceptance of the Afghan Constitution were not the pre-conditions but the outcome of talks with the Taliban, the assertion by the US Vice President signal an important policy shift in the US Afghanistan strategy.

It may be mentioned that Joe Biden was opposed to the policy of ‘fight, talk and build’ advocated by Pentagon and made no bones about his preference for political strategy marked by increased drone strikes, and limited military engagement during the policy review on Afghanistan. It was because of strong stance taken by him that President Obama refused to give what Pentagon and powerful generals wanted from him i.e. counterterrorism operations and announcement of fresh troop surgeas demanded by US Commander in Afghanistan General Stanley McChristal.

The second major development in this respect is the Taliban’s opening of contact office in Qatar to accelerate the process of dialogue with the US. The Taliban leadership has also admitted to being in touch with the US and opening of an office in Qatar. This would allow both sides an opportunity to engage directly and the US would not have to engage with multiple channels and shades of the Taliban thought. The Afghan High Peace Council, a bipartisan body established under slain Afghan leader Prof Bhurhan-ud-Din Rabbani with a mandate to pursue peace and reconciliation with the Taliban, has also welcomed the move. The third shift in the US approach is the plan for a faster and steeper handover of security to the Afghan authorities. The transition from direct combat to ‘aid and assist’ format is part of the larger US strategy to prepare for a full-scale pullout till 2014.

Do these developments indicate a discernible shift in the US ‘Exit and Surge Strategy’? The answer to this question would depend on how the Obama administration follows up on these basics. The consistency of policy would be tested when President Obama tries to align discordant elements within his administration in a bid to craft a national consensus first between his civilian and military aides represented by Vice President Joe Biden and the American military and later on between the Democrats and the Republicans both in and out of Congress.

However, this policy characterized by political accommodation and dialogue provides a feasible way out of the grave and complex situation, which has continued to deteriorate by the day despite injection of huge sums of money and employment of the state of the art military hard power. Given the economic recession and the high cost of the military engagement where victory remains elusive, the war is simply not sustainable with the war-wary public. 2012 being the election year, President Obama has to roll out a credible plan in the upcoming Chicago moot in July this year if he has to have any prospect of reelection.

The success of the American strategy would depend upon a few critical and external factors which at the moment promise little hope.

The first factor is the regional support for any solution to be sustainable and permanent. The cooperation between the US, Pakistan, Iran and India on the minimum acceptable formula is a sine qua non. The situation, on the other hand, is quite grim.

While the Obama administration has put fresh sanctions on Iran, its relations with Pakistan have hit an all-time low. India has been involved in efforts to undercut Pakistan’s role and legitimate interests in Afghanistan. The Strategic Declaration inked between India and Afghanistan last year has been interpreted as such. Pakistan has also complained of the Indian involvement in the subversive activities in restive Balochistan province by misusing the Afghan soil.

The US needs to align the regional countries for an Afghan solution which is possible due to engagement with these countries. Other key factors include the ability of the Afghan government to improve its governance and deliver modicum of the basic services to the Afghan citizens and building up capacity of Afghan security forces to take over the overall security responsibility after the 2014 withdrawal.

US insistence on concluding a post-withdrawal agreement by which it would retain some forces and access to bases in Afghanistan can force the Taliban to withdraw from the peace process. Both Iran and Pakistan would also be justified in raising an eyebrow over the US intentions.

In the light of these facts, forming a conclusive opinion on the endgame in Afghanistan remains a risky venture because there are many a slip between a cup and lip. It would be advisable if the Obama administration overcomes the policy contradictions and resolves the challenges that threaten to derail the nascent peace process.