Palestine-Israel Peace talks A crucial test for john kerry

If the return to the negotiating table agreed between the two sides in Washington recently leads to an enduring settlement, it will be a cause for international celebration. However, if the talks fail, as they have so often in the past, there might never be another realistic opportunity for Israelis and Palestinians to resolve a conflict that has lasted 65 years and cost thousands of lives.

It means that what John Kerry has done, in effect, is get the two sides to grab hold of a stick of dynamite. If they can’t defuse it within nine months through an agreement, it’s going to blow up: The Palestinians would take statehood to the United Nations, probably this time with broad European support; an angry Arab League would withdraw its peace initiative. It would be a big mess for everyone.

Tzipi Livni, the chief Israeli negotiator, recalled that when she first talked with Kerry about a new round of peace talks five months ago, he told her that ‘failure is not an option.’ By pushing the two sides into an actual negotiation, Kerry has put some teeth into that bromide. If they fail this time, it will cost the parties dearly. That provides harsh leverage for Washington.

However, it is heartening to note that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made a leap of confidence-building by agreeing to the release 104 Palestinian prisoners as a precursor to the Washington meeting.

Palestine, too, has shown a great willingness to give ground. While its starting point is a full return of all areas controlled by Israel since the 1967 Six-Day War, it is prepared to agree to some remaining in Israeli hands, provided there is a land swap elsewhere to compensate. That paves the way for a compromise.

The role of John Kerry becomes ever-more important in this regard. He is ready to be an active broker in this deal rather than a passive listener or mediator. When the two sides reach impasses or get bogged down on side issues, Kerry will seek to break the logjam with US proposals. By putting a nine-month fuse on his dynamite stick, Kerry limits stalling tactics of the sort adopted in the past by both sides.

Choosing Martin Indyk, a former ambassador to Israel, as special envoy to the talks is another useful prod. Through his work at the Brookings Institution and its Saban Center, Indyk has gathered a copious network of personal contacts across the Middle East. He can request favours and call in chits from around the region. Many would agree that because of Indyk’s experience and contacts, it will be hard for either side to game him.

 The negotiations will also have momentum from a big team of US experts that will be ready to advise both sides on technical issues, such as water and energy. An intriguing option for Kerry is a settlement that leaves unresolved some especially difficult issues, such as the status and division of Jerusalem. Michael Gordon and Isabel Kersh­ner made this point when they noted that a deal wouldn’t necessarily mean ‘the end of claims by either side.’ They could continue to disagree about who controls the al-Aqsa mosque, say, or the Western Wall. But for Israel to get the benefits of a full cessation of the conflict, it would have to resolve the hardest issues.

Kerry hasn’t yet gotten Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to endorse the U.S. position on the borders of the Palestinian state, despite strenuous efforts. But Kerry has assured the Palestinians that the United States favours the 1967 lines, plus mutually agreed swaps, a formula that should allow most West Bank settlers to remain within Israel.

The borders question is, at bottom, an Israeli political issue. But many Israelis agree with the view expressed by Israeli President Shimon Peres, who has said that withdrawal to the 1967 lines, with border swaps, would be acceptable.

One way to think about these negotiations is that they’re a kind of benign trap. Once the prey have been lured inside, it’s difficult for them to escape without either accomplishing the great work of peace or damaging themselves. Kerry would surely dispute that analogy. But unless it’s valid ‘unless failure really isn’t an option here because it would be so damaging’ then the naysayers will probably be right.

Nevertheless, the fact that all issues will be on the table, and that there is a target of completing negotiations within nine months, means this is the best chance for peace since the historic 1993 Oslo accords. People around the world should hope it is achieved.