Defence of the Mandate and Intervention Brigade

INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE

The United Nations Security Council passed its Resolution 2098 (2013) in March 2013. The second recital of the Resolution reads:

‘Recalling its resolution 2086 (2013) and reaffirming the basic principles of peacekeeping, including consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force, except in self-defence and defence of the mandate, and recognizing that the mandate of each peacekeeping mission is specific to the need and situation of the country concerned,’ (emphasis added)

The context of the resolution is interesting from the perspective of international relations and the role of world powers in conflict areas. The Democratic Republic of Congo was formerly known as Zaire. It is a Central African country with many big lakes and mineral riches. It is the second largest country in Africa by area and the eleventh largest in the world. It was a colony of Belgium till 1960, when it was declared independent. Its first Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, was killed in a coup. It is usually argued that the coup had blessings of Western powers and the UN did nothing to prevent his killing. Later, Mobutu Sese Soko became the head of the state and changed its name from Congo to Zaire and remained in power till 1997 as he had backing of the US and Belgium.

 On March 28, 2013, the UN Security Council unanimously approved the first-ever “offensive” UN peacekeeping brigade to battle rebels groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The ‘Intervention Brigade’, comprising more than 2,500 troops, will operate under orders to “neutralise” and “disarm” armed groups in the resource-rich east of the huge country. This piece presents a detailed analysis of this initiative of the UNSC in the context of International Law.
 In 1997, Laurent Kabila became the President by overthrowing the government of Mobutu. He renamed the country DRC. In 1998, a rebellion started in Kivu Region (province) of DRC against Kabila government. The rebellion attracted neighbouring countries into the fight between government and the rebels. The governments of Angola, Chad, Namibia and Zimbabwe supported the government of Kabila, whereas Rwanda and Uganda supported the rebels. As the matters got worse, the international community through the UN Security Council called for ceasefire and withdrawal of foreign troops. In 1999, Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was signed and for its enforcement and implementation, a United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) was established the same year through  the UN Security Council Resolution 1279 of 1999. After achieving the objective of implementation of ceasefire, the UN Security Council through another Resolution 1925 of 2010 entered into a new phase of stabilization of the DRC and therefore restyled the UN Mission in DRC as United Nations Organization Stabilization in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). Through the latest Resolution 2086 of 2013, the new Intervention Brigade has been authorized to MONUSCO. The factual justification, according to MONUSCO website, is that though many parts of DRC are now stabilized, the problems are still there in eastern parts. In order to ensure stability in DRC, a Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (PSC) was agreed upon by 11 regional countries, African Union and UN in February, 2013. The Intervention Brigade is expected to ‘neutralize’ the armed groups in eastern parts of DRC and to defend the mandate of the UN in the region.

In the backdrop of the situation adumbrated above, the latest Security Council Resolution was passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. From international law perspective, this calls for a nuanced appreciation. Following points, in the context, are worth appraisal:

First, the opening recital of the UN Security Council Resolution cited above, clearly brackets self-defence and defence of the mandate together, implying thus that the two concepts are at par and all that is justifiable in case of self-defence, can be imported for defence of the mandate. This propensity has the potential of offering space to Security Council to opt-in a full domain of mandate for implementing its earlier resolution. The declaratory role of the Security Council, by use of this device, may inadvertently take upon itself the onus of execution of its declared position; doing so will not be without perils of trampling upon the sovereign rights of the states.

Secondly, one of the stated objectives of the Intervention Brigade is to ‘neutralize’ the armed groups operating in DRC. The use of the word ‘neutralize’ is relatively foreign to the legalese applicable to peacekeeping and peace-enforcement missions envisioned by the UN Security Council. The word ‘neutralize’ has multiple implications as it will bring in the hard question of legal status of members of Intervention Brigade as combatants for the purposes of applicability of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), the branch of international law that deals with conduct of armed conflict rules.

Thirdly, the narrative of the UN on its website of MONUSCO evinces that the situation in DRC is improving; in which case, the decision to send in an Intervention Brigade with ‘neutralizing’ mandate has little justification.

The situation in DRC is a grim reminder of the ramifications of legacy of colonialism and of the interest games of the powerful countries. One of the stated objectives of the UN in its Charter is to regulate the use of force by the states, both at individual and collective levels. In case, the use of force is authorized on a basis of an imperfect UN Security Council, the likelihood of proliferation of conflict areas in the world will increase as use of force especially by outsiders has usually been counterproductive.

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