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Though independent since 1991, along with other former Soviet satellites, Ukraine has always been seen by Russia as a buffer between it and the West. Ukraine’s recent brush with European ascension was a direct security threat to Russia. If Ukraine were to join the EU and then NATO, Russia’s soft underbelly would be exposed to its old enemy. Russia is prepared to prevent that. The West is not hostile, but if the last century has taught Moscow any lessons, it is that Europe should be held at arm’s length. Since Ukraine and Belarus fall into this buffer zone, Russia will never allow them accession to NATO or even EU membership.
This policy is not unlike Cold War-era manoeuvring. In order to compete ideologically, militarily, and economically with the former USSR and its communist allies, the US used a strategy of geopolitical containment of the Soviet Union. Looking at Russia’s actions with Ukraine, it would seem the stalemate never quite ended rather it only abated when the former Soviet Union basically faced economic exhaustion from the competition with the US and its allies.
Economic cooperation with the West would benefit Russia today, but Vladimir Putin would rather return to the lost strength and glory of now-defunct Soviet-style rule. And, he has indeed made progress in gradual but systemic developments. It is Putin, not Russia, who fears the Westernization of Ukraine.
Thus Ukraine is in the foreign policy sights of both the East and the West, but in Crimea, the upper hand has gone to Russia. The EU is preoccupied with the shambles of recession for existing members while the US has exhausted support with unfinished tasks in Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere in the Middle East. The American portfolio over the last decade and a half has created more foes than friends.
In response to the crisis in Crimea, the US and European officials have tried to present a united front, but those more dependent on Russian energy and trade were reluctant. The resultant minor threats and sanctions seem to have had little effect on Putin’s decision-making.
In addition, it is wrong to compare Russian-style democracy and market forces with those of Europe and America. While the West might be better able to afford double-edged sanctions against Russia, Putin would be better able to weather the consequences than his rival politicians. It seems Putin didn’t move hastily in Crimea. He considered the consequences of the US and Western sanctions. While Obama and his European allies could not survive the vitriol of their democratic oppositions if the same happened at home, Putin doesn’t care how much Russian markets plummet.
Russia’s seizure of Crimea may hurt the Russian economy, but it is only serving to bolster Putin’s position at the polls. His support base runs profoundly deep in Russian society, and the Kremlin’s pro-war hysteria is gaining momentum for his popularity, serving the dual purposes of singling out dissidents and consolidating his power base.
Invading Crimea might cost Russia the opportunity to control the rest of Ukraine, but one can expect that Putin has thought of this. He still holds the cards to create turbulence by mobilizing his intelligence agencies, and some six million ethnic Russians still reside in Eastern Ukraine.
Russia has shown it is not a waning power anymore. In 2008, Russia pushed in Georgia, changing power calculations in the region. Now Putin’s intervention in Crimea has proven Europe has no power to challenge Russia with the Americans so far away. If Putin’s adventurism continues, the large ethnic Russian populations within Ukraine, Moldova, and even EU nations like Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia might be used by Russia to further push NATO’s limits.
The Kremlin has already threatened that if they are challenged by the US, Russia can create problems in Iran over nuclear talks. Moscow recently offered to build two civilian nuclear reactors in Iran and could also provide nuclear-military supplies beneath the surface, which would scuttle the US-Iranian negotiations. With this in consideration, the situation is looking more and more reminiscent of Cold War politics.
For now, Russia has Crimea, and the ball is still in Putin’s court. Europe and the United States have no appetite to engage in military power play with Russia as they are preoccupied with persistent troubles in their own spheres. From the fragmented European coalition, sanctions would exert a minimal pressure on Russia, and for any sanctions that America could impose, the Russians have a counter.
For now the West watches as the Ukraine imbroglio hangs on, and Putin considers his next move.
