Averting Water Wars in South Asia

It is becoming manifest that India is expanding the envelope of its allowable usage over the Jhelum and Chenab waters, sanctioned by the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) to severely impinge upon Pakistan’s water share, which is gross violation of the underlying spirit of the Treaty.

The Treaty that is underwritten by the World Bank minutely sets out the procedure for settlement of disputes, which are likely to arise. The conflict resolution mechanism includes the Permanent Indus Water Commission comprising a commissioner from each country and the option of approaching the International Court of Arbitration if the bilateral interaction and even the appointment of a neutral expert fails to resolve the differences. Despite the fact that the IWT is widely hailed for maintaining stability in the region by diffusing tensions caused by the water disputes, the US Senate Report raises questions whether the IWT can address India’s growing use of the shared waters and Pakistan’s increasing demand for these waters for agricultural purposes.

Treaties are mere scraps of papers if not backed by respective national resolve and goodwill of the signatories to make these work; and IWT is no exception. The fact that the IWT has functioned for so long is because it is based on practical rationale and fair distribution of resources. The Treaty gives the exclusive right over the waters of three Eastern Rivers; Ravi, Sutlej and Bias to India and of the three Western Rivers; Indus, Jhelum and Chenab to Pakistan. The Treaty allows India, as the upper riparian state, certain specific consumptive and non-consumptive uses in the Western rivers as well. While it circumscribes India’s right to build water storage facilities on the rivers allocated to Pakistan, it allows construction of run-of the-river hydro electrical projects without affecting the flow of water into Pakistan ‘nor altering its timings. Timing is an important issue because agriculture in Pakistan is dependent not only on the quantity but also the availability of water during critical period of the sowing season. The underlying spirit of the Treaty remains that while India may tap the hydro-electrical potential of western Rivers in its territory but without negatively affecting the volume or timings of the water that the IWT entitles Pakistan to. Unfortunately, the gap between the ideals and the ground reality is widening with every passing day.

It is becoming manifest that India is expanding the envelope of its allowable usage over the Jhelum and Chenab waters, sanctioned by the IWT, to severely impinge upon Pakistan’s share of dedicated waters, which is gross violation of the underlying spirit of the Treaty. It was in this context that the differences over design parameters of the Baghliar Hydroelectric project on Chenab River, 147 km upstream of Marala Headworks, saw Pakistan approaching for the appointment of a neutral expert to preclude Indian efforts to retain water storage capability in excess of the provisions of the IWT.

The ‘determination’ by Raymond Lafitte, a Swiss expert, was delivered on February 12, 2007. While the findings were reasonable; upholding many of Pakistan’s objections yet the reinterpretation of the Treaty’s clauses, based on contemporary engineering practices allowed India a design which allowed it an increased water regulation capability. Pakistan’s vulnerability to Indian hegemony soon became apparent when India, instead of filling Baghliar during the rainy season, ‘when water is available in abundance, chose to do so exactly at a time when it inflicted maximum loss to the farmers of Pakistan.

India’s location as an upper riparian state puts it in the driving seat to work out a modus operandi  Pakistan. But it will be wishful on our part to assume that, even in the presence of IWT’s well laid guidelines, India will choose to adopt a stance marked with empathy and eminence that the region so desperately desires of her.