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It is important that Pakistan, as a partner and an ally of US war on terror, is treated with dignity and sovereign equality. The Pak- US relationship will remain on a roller coaster unless the whole spectrum of Gen Musharraf’s written and unwritten arrangements with the US are revisited to draw new ‘terms of engagement’ in keeping with the State’s interests.
The Pakistan-US relationship is not about any particular incident or individual or about any Afghanistan-related irritant. It is an old relationship that has remained fundamentally strong and enduring despite many ups and downs. Ironically, however, it is an enigmatic equation that never had any conflict of interest but also never had any mutuality of interests. The only mutuality in this hinge has been one of expediency with each side always aiming at different goals and objectives to be derived from this relationship.
For Pakistan, the issues of security and survival in a turbulent and hostile regional environment and its problems with India were the overriding policy factors in its relations with Washington. The US policy goals in Pakistan, on the other hand, have traditionally encompassed a wide range of its regional and global interests, especially the issues of nuclear and missile proliferation, India-Pakistan hostility, democracy, human rights, economic reform and now terrorism.
In the process, this relationship has seen alternating phases of engagement and estrangement depending on the convergence and divergence of each side’s respective goals and policies. For much of its history, this enigmatic relationship has lacked continuity, a larger conceptual framework, and a shared vision beyond the narrowly based and vaguely defined issue-specific priorities. Unpredictability has been another consistent feature of this relationship which has gone through regular interruptions in its intensity and integrity.
Pakistan’s post-9/11 alliance with the US was the beginning of another painful chapter in Pakistan’s history. In the blinking of an eye, we became a battleground of the US war on terror, and have been paying a heavy price in terms of human and material losses.
Pakistan has been the main target in an al-Qaeda-led war with almost 35,000 Pakistani civilians and security personnel having lost their lives in terrorist attacks in the last few years. In addition to invisible emotional fall out, this war has cost Pakistan staggering military burden, unquantifiable collateral damage and irreparable economic loss in the form of massive internal displacement, trade and production slowdown, and investor hesitation.
And yet, one is bewildered at Pakistan’s demonization by its friends and allies. It is time to correct this approach. It is important that Pakistan, as a partner and an ally, is treated with dignity and sovereign equality.
US foreign policy goals in South Asia are rooted in its overarching global objectives and interests. And its global objectives are driven, as they would be in the case of any other sovereign state, by the imperatives of its foreign policy. The eastward focus of America’s global power, however, is not something new. It represents the long gravity shift of global economic power from the Euro-Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific regions.
America is no stranger to our region. In the post-World War II era, the real Cold War took place on Asian soils which witnessed some of the most violent eruptions of the East-West struggle and even some of the longest wars of the last century. America’s larger Asian focus represents its abiding interest in these regions especially those with known but hidden oil and gas reserves.
China’s Rise inherent in phenomenal growth of its global power and economy has been of special concern to the US which has been building its own regional equations to contain this phenomenon. It has also had big stakes in the economic power of Japan and other East Asian economic tigers, besides its new interest in the burgeoning Indian economy with its tremendous population-cum- development driven market potential.
For any regional approach to succeed in Afghanistan, Obama was convinced the India-Pakistan equation will have to be kept straight. But in the actual execution of his AfPak policy, Obama was soon detracted from his stated goals.
Even though they were allegedly aimed at suspected Al-Qaeda or Taliban havens, they killed many in nocent men, women and children. Even if they had the vague consent of Pakistan’s rulers, they constituted violation of the UN Charter. No country, however powerful or dominant, can resort to pre-emptive or preventive use of force, or to any punitive action, unless it is authorised by the UN Security Council within the scope of Articles 42 and 51 of the Charter.
Pakistan’s Afghan dilemma: Unfortunately, as was evident in the Abbottabad incident, the real Afghan issue now starts and ends with Pakistan. This has had an alarmingly adverse impact on Pakistan’s psyche which is already perturbed by America’s indifference to its legitimate security concerns and sensitivities. Our Afghanistan-related problems are aggravated by the complex regional configuration with a growing Indo-US nexus, India’s strategic ascendancy in the region and its unprecedented influence in Afghanistan with serious nuisance potential against Pakistan’s security interests.
The US-Pakistan relationship will never really be a trusted one again until the grinding conflict in Afghanistan comes to an end in a manner that does not jeopardise Pakistan’s legitimate security interests.
What comes as a crude shock to the people of Pakistan is the continuing US-led NATO forces’ incursions inside Pakistan’s territory. The premeditated November 26 Mohmand attacks killing 24 Pakistani security personnel seem to have crossed all limits. Pakistan has suspended its transit route for NATO supplies until a formal apology for the attacks. An investigation to determine the facts about the attacks is said to be in progress.
But let’s be honest. The problem is not the relationship. The problem is its poor and shortsighted management on both sides. For Washington, it remains a transactional relationship. On our side, the problem is the nature that our successive self-centred rulers have always sought to give to this relationship as their political and economic lifeline through their self-serving notorious deals. To them, this relationship is all about their personal interests. National interests have no meaning or relevance to them. They have squandered our sovereignty, dignity and national honour.
Howsoever enigmatic, US-Pakistan relationship is an important equation. Both countries need each other. It is time for both sides now to set a better bilateral perspective for this relationship to make it a mutually beneficial, normal and functional relationship with a policy focus on the people of Pakistan rather than on one man. The objective must be not to weaken this important equation but to strengthen it by infusing in it greater political, economic and strategic content. It must no longer remain a ‘transactional’ relationship.
Obviously, Washington as a global sole super power has its own priorities as part of its larger Asian agenda. For us, given our geo-political location, the foremost challenge to our foreign policy lay in our ability to withstand America’s militarist pressures without compromising on our national interests. It seems our diplomacy in Washington has been the victim of cross purposes rooted in our domestic political intrigues as evidenced in the Memogate.
It is time now to rectify the situation. Ambassador Munter is doing a good job for his country. We also need in Washington an ambassador with no ‘conflict of interest.’ Both sides should give diplomacy a chance not only to avert a conflictual situation but also to strengthen their relationship by infusing in it greater political, economic and strategic content. It must no longer remain what Vice-President Joe Biden described as a ‘transactional’ relationship, and must go beyond the issue of terrorism.
The US on its part must reach out to democratic and liberal forces and the business community in our country, and also the younger generation in Pakistan which may resent US power but not its ideals. And in their success alone lies the very future of Pakistan as a strong and stable democratic country with a moderate and progressive outlook and as a factor of regional and global stability.
But one thing is clear. This relationship will remain on a roller coaster unless the whole spectrum of Gen Musharraf’s written and unwritten arrangements with the US are revisited to draw new ‘terms of engagement’ in keeping with the State’s interests. Any security cooperation arrangement with the US must be covered by a formal “status of forces agreement†laying down a mutually applicable framework of cooperation modalities.
The writer is a former foreign secretary
The Statement Adopted at Ottawa Dialogue1 Held in Copenhagen
Following-on their previous meetings, at Stanford in July, 2011 and recalling the Lahore Declaration and MOU of 1999, the members of the Ottawa Dialogue devoted their session held in Copenhagen on December 12-13, 2011to the elaboration of specific and practical CBMs. The Copenhagen meeting discussed the impact of emerging technologies on strategic stability, focussing on the topics of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) and Cruise Missiles. The general sense was that agreements to restrain the development of these technologies are unlikely in the present atmosphere, although such controls would be desirable. Therefore, the members of the Ottawa Dialogue believe that the current focus should be on CBMs which could constrain destabilising deployment options and enhance stability in a future crisis.
The members of the Ottawa Dialogue recommend that their governments should:
Initiate an official, ongoing high-level dialogue on the impact of BMD on regional security; and
Add cruise missiles to the Agreement on Pre-Notification of Flight Testing of Ballistic Missiles.
More generally, the members of the Ottawa Dialogue recommended that their governments:
Sign a CBM to the effect that their land-based nuclear arsenals will remain ‘de-mated’ and ‘de-alerted’ in peacetime;
Initiate a high-level official dialogue over how new and emerging technologies, such as future sea-based systems and nuclear-armed cruise missiles, will impact upon strategic stability; and
More generally, enter into a high-level official dialogue over ‘strategic sufficiency’ the question of how future nuclear force development can be kept to the lowest level consistent with national security needs.
In a focused discussion on how Communication CBMs could be enhanced, the members of the Ottawa Dialogue noted that communications CBMs must be effective in three different environments (peacetime, periods of escalation of tension and periods of conflict), and different measures and levels of communication may be required in these different phases of relations. To that end, the members of the Ottawa Dialogue recommended that:
Existing hotlines and communications channels should be hardened, manned on a 24 hour, 7 day a week basis and supplemented with secure video-links;
There was a discussion of possible cooperation on such areas as the safe operation of nuclear power plants and the security of radioactive sources used in medical and industrial applications. There was consensus that the safe operation of nuclear power plants would be a suitable area for future work in the Ottawa Dialogue, but not on the matter of nuclear security.
Finally, the participants expressed the hope that there would be no conflict between the two countries. However in the event of a conventional conflict breaking out they agreed that all efforts should be made to prevent an escalation of the conflict and suggested that, in addition to the faithful implementation of the agreement on non attack on nuclear facilities, both sides should also refrain from attacks on sensitive locations, a list of which should be drawn up immediately.
The Ottawa Dialogue is a Track Two process comprising a distinguished group of academics and retired senior officials and military officers from India and Pakistan. It is led by Peter Jones, a professor from the University of Ottawa’s Graduate School of Public and International Affairs. The ongoing dialogue process has already resulted in the adoption of an ambitious list of nuclear confidence-building measures (CBMs) which have since been submitted to the two governments for their joint consideration.
