Calm Before the Storm

One source of brewing tension is Islamabad’s interest in opening peace talks with the TTP, which is waging a brutal and unyielding insurgency against the Pakistani state — one that targets civilians, the government, and the military alike. Sharif campaigned heavily on the issue of talks, so his resounding electoral victory gives him a strong mandate to pursue negotiations. Since taking office, his government has floated the idea of launching a “working group” to explore talks — even as the TTP has declared its unwillingness to negotiate and continued to stage attacks. Likewise, the new provincial government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa — near Pakistan’s tribal belt — is led by a party sharing the PML-N’s desire to talk to the TTP.

For Washington, the fear is that a peace agreement between Islamabad and the TTP would merely appease a terrorist organization that has never respected such agreements previously. Back in early 2009, for example, after concluding peace deals with Islamabad, the TTP seized control of the picturesque region of Swat — a mere 60 miles from the capital, Islamabad. The group violently enforced a harsh form of Sharia law until the military recaptured the region several months later. This time around, the fear is that instead of laying down its arms, the TTP could again use a ceasefire to regroup — and then carve out new areas of control that enable it to intensify its campaign of attacks on NATO supply vehicles.

 In effect, Pakistani peace talks with the TTP could imperil US security interests in Afghanistan at a time when the Obama administration is desperately trying to orchestrate an orderly withdrawal from that country. Against this backdrop, the potential for bilateral friction is considerable.

Another looming crisis with the potential to derail US-Pakistan relations is America’s drone war, despite the fact that US strikes have tapered off in recent months. Pakistan’s previous governments have publicly condemned drone strikes while tacitly approving them — thus following the lead of the military, which has consented to them. But Sharif is taking a harder line, having declared an end to the policy of facilitating strikes from “behind the scenes” and demanded that the programme end immediately.

Washington has no intention of ending drone strikes in Pakistan before the end of 2014; it has few other tools to deploy against Pakistan-based militants that allegedly target international forces in Afghanistan. Additionally, the Obama administration may feel compelled to take full advantage of drone strikes through the end of next year, given that their use after 2014 will likely decline.

The extent to which these issues aggravate US-Pakistan relations in the coming weeks and months will depend on the Pakistani military — the ultimate arbiter of relations with the United States. The army’s position on peace talks with the TTP and drones appears closer to that of Washington than of Islamabad. The military is reportedly unhappy about the prospect of talking to extremists responsible for the deaths of thousands of soldiers. While it hasn’t ruled out negotiations, army statements suggest considerable uneasiness about the possibility.

As for drones, there’s little reason to think the Pakistani military will end a policy that has weakened the TTP, arguably its most formidable nemesis. Drone strikes have killed multiple high-level TTP targets, including commander Nek Muhammad in 2004, top leader Baitullah Mehsud in 2009, and second-in-command Wali ur-Rehman recently. A recent McClatchy report credited drones with breaking the TTP’s “chain of command and coherency.”

If the military’s position on these issues carries the day, then the chances of fresh US-Pakistan tensions are reduced. This presents the Obama administration with a conundrum: Its interests are best served if the Pakistani military marginalizes the very civilian government that Washington wants to help strengthen. In other words, if the Pakistani government pushes back against the military, US security interests in Afghanistan could suffer.

Such pushback is certainly a possibility, given Sharif’s past tiffs with the army (one of which led to his ouster in 1999), and given his apparent desire to exert influence over matters traditionally controlled by the military. Soon after taking office, for example, Sharif announced he would take on the portfolios of defence and foreign affairs — two areas long overseen by the armed forces.

Then again, there’s no guarantee that the military’s positions will remain the same. November marks the end of Army chief Ashfaq Parvez Kayani’s term. If his replacement decides the army has suffered enough from fighting the TTP and opts for talks, and that drones are no longer worth supporting, then US-Pakistan relations could revert to crisis mode. On the other hand, Washington could strike a deal with Islamabad that gives the latter more say over drones. Such an accord could defuse tensions, though it’s unclear if the bilateral relationship enjoys sufficient mutual trust to make such an agreement a reality.

Regardless of how this all plays out, one unsettling reality remains firmly in place: Pakistan’s security establishment continues to sponsor militant groups that threaten and attack the United States. Until there is peace with India — which won’t happen anytime soon — the Pakistani state will continue to offer sanctuary to the Afghan Taliban, Haqqani network, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), and other groups seeking to limit Indian influence in Afghanistan — and that pose direct threats to US troops. No matter how smoothly relations may be sailing along, US-Pakistan ties would take a major hit if the LeT were to commit an attack in the United States or — more realistically — if the Haqqani network were to launch another spectacular assault on American facilities in Afghanistan.

So by all means, expect Kerry’s Pakistan visit to feature smiles and handshakes. There may be announcements of new US economic assistance projects, statements about cooperation on Afghanistan and counterterrorism, and timetables set for the re-launch of the Strategic Dialogue and bilateral investment treaty talks.

Yet behind the bonhomie, trouble lurks. Instead of depicting Kerry’s Pakistan trip as a prelude to an extended period of goodwill, we should simply regard it as a respite from the tensions that have contaminated the relationship in recent years — tensions that could easily flare up anew in the months ahead.